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This article critically examines recent calls by anthropologists to focus on what they call 
“everyday Islam.” We locate this new literature within two tensions central to anthropology: 
first, its dual commitment to humanity’s heterogeneity and commonality, and second, its 
dual imperative to account for dominant social structures and individual resistance. We 
argue that the concept of everyday Islam emphasizes one side of these paradigmatic debates, 
highlighting the universality of humans and emphasizing opposition to norms. We then 
take up the distinction this literature makes between everyday Muslims and Salafi Muslims. 
We suggest that a reinvestment in everyday Islam ends up discounting the validity, reality, 
and ontology of those framed as Salafi Muslims and invalidates ethnographic inquiry into 
ultra-orthodox Muslim life. Even as scholarship on everyday Islam attempts to expand the 
anthropology of Islam, then, it restricts the field instead by demarcating anthropology’s 
proper object of study in a very narrow way.
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Two central tensions lie at the heart of the anthropological endeavor. The first is 
between the desire, on the one hand, to delineate the multiple and heterogeneous 
ways in which human beings live and make sense of their lives, and, on the other 
hand, to underscore the commonalities and shared conditions of seemingly diffe-
rent life-worlds in order to define the human. The second tension is between, on 
the one hand, the imperative to identify powerful social structures and norms that 
mediate individuals and, on the other, the attempt to account for individual creati-
vity, agency, and resistance. While these two underlying tensions have played out in 
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various ways throughout the modern history of the discipline,1 they seem to have 
found a new site of articulation in the contemporary anthropology of Islam.
Over the past two decades, Islamic revivalism, defined as the unprecedented 
worldwide engagement with exegetical texts and theological reasoning by Muslims 
untrained in traditional Islamic institutions, has become a major field within the 
anthropology of Islam. Dispensing with earlier modernist accounts that predicted 
the secularization of non-Western societies and pathologized the supposed Islamic 
exception,2 much of this literature has sought to make sense of the discourses and 
practices of revivalist Muslims from within the network of concepts on which these 
Muslims draw. In so doing, it has equally sought to dismantle a common set of 
binary oppositions—modernity and tradition, politics and religion, rational deli-
beration and religious discipline, autonomy and authority—that have long informed 
studies of the Muslim world. Recently, however, a growing number of scholars 
have begun to criticize this apparent overinvestment in Islamic revivalism and es-
pecially the focus on ethical self-cultivation through the inhabitation of Islamic 
norms, which, they argue, presents two major problems. First, these scholars hold, 
the focus on piety and Islamic norms constitutes a reductionist account that privi-
leges religion at the expense of political, economic, and other structures mediating 
Muslim life. The second, related critique is that the focus on piety lacks complexity; 
what critics mean is that ethical self-cultivation is never a totalizing project, nor are 
its outcomes easily predictable. Rather, “struggle, ambivalence, incoherence, and 
failure must also receive attention in the study of everyday religiosity” (Osella and 
Soares 2010: 11). This call for complexity entails emphasizing the internal contra-
dictions, ambiguities, and incoherences that inform the discourses and practices 
of ordinary Muslims, an approach framed as attending to “everyday religiosity” or 
“everyday Islam.”
Our essay is an attempt to think through this new investment in the “everyday” 
and grows out of our own experience as anthropologists of the Muslim world. We 
have noticed over the past few years a remarkable uptick in panels, conferences, 
articles, and edited collections in Europe and the United States that bear the title 
of “everyday Islam,” such as a 2014 online curated collection with that very title by 
Cultural Anthropology,3 a forthcoming issue of Ethnologie Française on “everyday 
aspects” of Muslim life, the edited volume Ordinary lives and grand schemes: An 
anthropology of everyday religion (Schielke and Debevec 2012b), and the already 
cited Islam, politics, anthropology by Filippo Osella and Benjamin Soares (2010), 
1. Perhaps the most familiar instantiations of the diversity/unity question are the debates 
between Bronislaw Malinowski (1922) and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1976) and then be-
tween Marshall Sahlins (1987, 1996) and Gananath Obeyesekere (1992), about “native” 
rationality. Debates between poststructuralist anthropologists inspired by Foucault 
and Bourdieu and anthropologists of “practice theory” remain a prime example of the 
power/agency problem (cf. infra).
2. Early examples include Max Weber’s examination of Islam’s theological difference from 
Christianity; for a fuller account, see Turner (1978) and Huff and Schluchter (1999).
3. The collection includes essays published previously in the journal by Al-Mohammad 
(2012), Osanloo (2006), Rouse and Hoskins (2004), Khan (2006), and George (2009), 
as well as interviews with the authors.
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which emerged from a 2009 special issue of the Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute. Rather than simply dismiss this framing, we wish to take it as the start-
ing point for a deeper conversation about a number of important questions raised 
by this literature on the everyday, questions we believe are central not only to the 
anthropology of Islam but to anthropology itself. Indeed, the global Islamic revival 
and the growing public visibility of Islam in the West has generated a great deal of 
debate in academia and beyond, with significant analytical, epistemological, and 
methodological implications for the discipline of anthropology, and especially for 
the study of religion and ethics. “Ordinary” or “everyday” ethics4 has become a site 
of anthropological attention (including within this journal) and much of that work 
engages with the seminal contributions from anthropologists of Islam like Saba 
Mahmood and Talal Asad, even if to refute them.5 Michael Lambek (2012), for in-
stance, has insisted on the need to locate ethics outside the religious domain; James 
Laidlaw (2014) has called for highlighting the complexities and contradictions in-
trinsic to ethical deliberation; and Michael Lempert (2013, 2014) has cautioned 
against any easy locatability or immanence of ethics, including in the everyday.
This turn to ordinary ethics has found its translation in the anthropology of 
Islam through the idea of everyday Islam. Our essay is therefore an implicit en-
gagement with the aforementioned literature on everyday ethics, although we are 
less interested here in the second term of this pairing (“ethics”) than in the first 
(“everyday”). Our aim is not to theorize what ordinary or everyday ethics mean 
to us, but rather to interrogate the underlying assumptions and resulting effects 
of framing certain phenomena as “everyday.” We will argue throughout this article 
that the concept of the everyday, and the way in which it has been recuperated 
within the anthropology of Islam, seems to emphasize one side of the paradigmatic 
agency/power and unity/diversity debates within anthropology, reiterating human 
creativity against the weight of norms and highlighting the universally shared con-
ditions of the human subject. We suggest, moreover, that beyond merely rearticu-
lating a commitment to agency and human unity, the turn to everyday Islam has 
(sometimes unintended) conceptually, methodologically, and politically proble-
matic effects. Calls for a reinvestment in the “everyday” or “actual” lives of Muslims 
explicitly or implicitly mark revivalist or pious Muslims as exceptional and, more 
insidiously, not “real.” As a consequence, this new scholarship discounts certain 
forms of Muslim life, invalidates anthropological inquiry into those ways of being 
Muslim, and redefines anthropology’s proper object of study in a very particular 
way. In other words, even as this scholarship attempts to expand the anthropology 
of Islam, it significantly narrows the field instead. In pursuing this line of analysis, 
we seek not only to understand how a tacit attachment to a set of secular-liberal 
sensibilities and norms underpins a profound political and affective discomfort 
4. As Michael Lempert observes, the terms “ordinary” and “everyday” are largely inter-
changeable in this literature (2013: 387n1).
5. James Laidlaw’s The subject of virtue (2014) nicely illustrates how the current “ethi-
cal turn” in anthropology has been directly influenced by ongoing debates within the 
anthropology of Islam, and a large part of his book is devoted to recent developments 
in that field. For example, his chapter “The ‘question of freedom’ in anthropology” 
(138–78) is largely a critical engagement with the work of Saba Mahmood.
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with (certain tendencies within) Islamic revivalism but also how social-scientific 
narratives—in this case a commitment to the everyday—can play a crucial role 
in adjudicating the ontological truthfulness, authenticity, and, ultimately, human-
ness, of various life-worlds.
Islamic piety and everyday ethics
Starting in the 1980s, the anthropology of Islam began to focus on revivalist tenden-
cies in various parts of the Muslim world. Much of this research initially emerged 
to account for why Muslim societies were not fulfilling modernist expectations of 
increasing secularization and decreasing religiosity. For some analysts, Islamic re-
vivalism indicated Islam’s theological incommensurability with secular modernity 
(Gellner 1992). Others insisted on the failed promise of modernity and the limited 
capacities of newly established nation states in the Arab world for economic and 
political integration after independence (Kepel 2012). These studies were soon re-
placed by works that problematized such a one-dimensional understanding of the 
routes modernization might take, and especially the notion that modernization 
would necessarily entail secularization. Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori’s in-
fluential Muslim politics (1996), for example, argued that revivalist tendencies do 
not signal a rupture with modernization so much as represent an instantiation of it, 
and that what often passes as a return to tradition is, in fact, a complex articulation 
of modernization. Rejecting the well-established polarity between modernity and 
religion, this scholarship found that postcolonial, modernist transformations, in-
cluding mass media and mass education, facilitated rather than prevented various 
forms of Islamic revivalism.6
Taking a somewhat different approach to the relationship between tradition and 
modernity, but with a similar commitment to make sense of Muslim subjectivities 
from an emic perspective, and drawing on Talal Asad’s (1986b) framework of Islam 
as an always evolving discursive tradition, other studies began to demonstrate how 
processes of modernization enabled the renewed cultivation of older, “traditional” 
ethical sensibilities and authoritative practices (Agrama 2012; Hirschkind 2006; 
Mahmood 2005; Salvatore 2007).7 It is against this approach that much of the new 
literature on everyday Islam positions itself, so it seems worthwhile to sketch some 
of the former’s core interventions using two exemplary texts: Saba Mahmood’s Poli-
tics of piety (2005) and Charles Hirschkind’s The ethical soundscape (2006). Both 
6. See Deeb (2006); Salvatore (2007); Starrett (1998). Gregory Starrett, for instance, ar-
gues that mass education in postcolonial Egypt led to the “objectification” of the 
Islamic tradition, i.e., its construction as a separate and clearly demarcated entity to be 
harnessed for economic, political, and social development. The resulting ability of or-
dinary Muslims to participate in debates about Islam and its role in social and political 
life led, in turn, to the Islamic revival in Egypt.
7. Armando Salvatore (2007), for instance, analyzes how notions of islah or maslaha are 
recuperated in postcolonial Egypt and connected to notions of public interest. Hussein 
Ali Agrama (2012) likewise examines how the concept of hisba is assimilated into mod-
ern conceptions of state sovereignty.
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are ethnographic studies of the ethical engagements and daily struggles of ordinary 
pious Muslims in Cairo. While Mahmood’s work concerns pious women who par-
ticipate in mosque study groups, Hirschkind’s looks at male city dwellers who rely 
on audio cassette sermons in their projects of ethical self-reform. Mahmood and 
Hirschkind argue that through various practices of ethical self-cultivation—which 
they understand as bodily practices of self-discipline aimed at restructuring a set of 
moral, sensorial, and affective dispositions in accordance with authoritative Islamic 
norms—their interlocutors remake themselves into virtuous Muslim subjects. Al-
though Mahmood and Hirschkind do not use the everyday as an analytical frame, 
they detail the daily ruminations, conversations, and difficulties these women and 
men encounter in their ethical journeys and demonstrate how these are informed 
by a constant engagement with the Islamic tradition. Indeed, everyday life presents 
a series of challenges that require ethical decision-making: should one meet a col-
league in a café that serves alcohol? Should a woman alone ride in a taxi with a male 
driver? Should one got to a mosque study group one’s husband is firmly against it? 
These are all questions that pertain to piety as much as they do to the domain of the 
everyday. They are also all questions that are usually answered through some refe-
rence to Islamic authority, to the exegetical tradition and, ultimately, to the Quran 
and the Sunna.8 This does not mean that these kinds of ethical questions are ea-
sily answerable via a “literalist” reading of the sources and without debate, or that 
ethical action is simply a question of following the rules. Rather, it means that the 
opposition between piety and the everyday—and the concomitant opposition be-
tween textual norm and individual practice—is untenable.
Consequently, Mahmood’s and Hirschkind’s monographs engage with the 
broader anthropological study of ethics and religion. Recent work has defined eth-
ics as an essential condition of everyday life and of the human (Das 2010, 2012; 
Lambek 2010b). This scholarship has tried to reconfigure older debates on ethics by 
showing how ethical considerations are an intrinsic part of everyday life and do not 
necessarily rely on moral (or religious) frameworks. While Mahmood and Hirsch-
kind similarly problematize any differentiation or temporal suspension between 
ethics and everyday life by showing how ethical commitment is at once deeply 
political, societal, and individual, they also refute the notion of an immanent ethi-
cal realm, and therefore any stark distinction between the domain of “religion” and 
that of the “everyday.”9 This remains a crucial point of differentiation within the 
scholarship on ordinary ethics. In contrast to those scholars—including scholars 
8. John Bowen (2009) examines similar kinds of questions that emerge for Muslims in 
France. These debates, Bowen shows, occur on two levels. On the first, more mundane 
level, French Muslims have to determine how to live, work, marry, and sacrifice accord-
ing to Islamic norms in a non-Muslim environment. The second level—what Bowen 
calls metareasoning—concerns how best to think about the questions posed at the first 
level, that is, how best to determine which tools and traditions Muslims should draw 
upon to figure out how to live, work, marry, and sacrifice in a non-Muslim context. 
Lara Deeb and Mona Harb (2013) consider a similar process among Shi‘ite Muslims 
with regard to pious forms of leisure in Beirut.
9. Lempert makes a similar critique of much of the work on ordinary ethics, arguing 
that it can often harden “dichotomies of small and large, micro and macro, implicit 
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of the Muslim world—who posit a strong distinction between ethics and religion 
and seem invested in emphasizing that people behave ethically outside the domain 
of religion and without reference to explicit moral norms (e.g., Al-Mohammad 
2012; Al-Mohammad and Peluso 2012; George 2009), Mahmood and Hirschkind 
argue that conduct becomes ethical to the extent that it is situated—by the implicit 
or explicit intentions of the actors themselves—within a broader moral horizon 
such that ethical practice is constantly self-transformative.10 This latter approach 
has been influential in shaping new directions in the anthropology of religion in 
general, and of Islam in particular. A number of recent studies have attended to the 
way individuals constantly make and remake themselves into what they consider 
good Muslims through ordinary actions (Deeb and Harb 2013; Fernando 2014; 
Jacobsen 2011; Jouili 2015). While these actions (like not getting angry at a sibling 
or being kind to one’s neighbors) are not immediately recognizable as “religious” 
(unlike, say, wearing a headscarf or praying five times a day) they are nonetheless 
fundamental to the kind of ethical subjectivity many Muslims attempt to cultivate 
in themselves.
Finally, Mahmood’s and Hirschkind’s work on ethics, in conjunction with 
their de-naturalization of the conventions of secular thought and praxis, paved 
the way for new scholarship that has sought to unravel how liberalism and secu-
larism—and not just Islam—operate as moral fields enacted through everyday 
practices. For instance, our own scholarship has turned to the secular as a site of 
specific norms with attendant forms of ethical self-cultivation. We have argued 
that, like various forms of religiosity, secularity too includes a range of ethical, 
social, physical, and sexual dispositions, hence the need to apprehend the secular 
via its sensorial, aesthetic, and embodied dispositions and not only its political 
ones.11 In other words, by radically provincializing secular concepts, categories, 
and explicit” and that we should take care “not to sever the entanglements that make 
[ordinary ethics] seem quotidian in the first place” (2013: 386).
10. In her account of ethics, Mahmood relies on the distinct Aristotelian tradition drawn 
on by her interlocutors, for whom everyday behavior is connected to a process of ethi-
cal self-transformation. Although she distinguishes between morality and ethics, she 
sees them as interlinked, deploying Foucault’s differentiation between ethical substance 
and modes of subjectivation or techniques of the self. Mahmood does not see morality 
as a set of abstract rules to which the subject acquiesces; “Rather, Foucault’s framework 
assumes that there are many different ways of forming a relationship with a moral code, 
each of which establishes a particular relationship between capacities of the self (will, 
reason, desire, action, etc.) and a given norm” (2012: 234). Thus “the piety movement 
has a strong individualizing impetus that requires each person to adopt a set of ascetic 
practices for shaping moral conduct” (235).
11. By examining secular criticism of and punitive action against veiling, Mayanthi 
Fernando (2014; see also Selby and Fernando 2014) analyzes secularity’s underlying 
sex/gender norms and secular power’s investment in and interpellation of female bod-
ies. Similarly, Nadia Fadil (2011) considers not veiling as an aesthetic of the self inti-
mately tied to a moral subjectivity grounded in liberal ethical norms. By understanding 
not veiling as an everyday practice of ethical self-cultivation, Fadil challenges a hege-
monic secular-liberal viewpoint of the non-veil as a natural way of being.
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and attachments, Mahmood’s and Hirschkind’s work—and that of Asad (1993, 
2003) before them—enabled scholars to make secularism and secularity not just 
the background condition of their intellectual work but instead an object of ob-
servation and analysis.
Such epistemological volte-faces have a long history in anthropology. Yet this 
ethnographic attention to pious self-cultivation, the critical analysis of the rela-
tionship between morality and ethics, and the provincialization of secular norms 
and values have provoked an antagonistic reaction—sometimes quite vociferous—
among a number of scholars within and outside the discipline of anthropology.12 
The turn to everyday Islam is part of this reaction. The following sections therefore 
attend to key texts and key claims in this turn. Our aim is not necessarily to invali-
date this work or even its critiques of the (over) focus on Islamic piety.13 Rather, 
we seek to understand the scholarly as well as the moral-political purchase of this 
explicit turn to the everyday. In sum, we are interested in why “everyday Islam” 
has become such a popular analytical framework for so many anthropologists of 
Islam.14 We are particularly puzzled by the opposition between piety and the every-
day posited by much of this literature since, as we made clear above, everyday prac-
tice and ordinary Muslims are a central part of the earlier scholarship on Islamic 
piety and ethics. We want to suggest that the everyday acts here less as an empirical 
site of observation than a normative frame that enables the restoration of a con-
ceptualization of agency primarily understood as creative resistance to (religious) 
norms. It is to that argument we now turn.
Practices of everyday resistance
The notion of the everyday has long been central to anthropology as one of the 
most privileged sites of analysis to examine the “imponderabilia of actual life,” to 
12. See Abbas (2013); Bangstad (2011); Gourgouris (2013); Mufti (2013); Robbins (2013).
13. In fact, we are sympathetic to this critique: as Fadil argues, the idea of “veiling as an 
idiosyncrasy that needs to be explained or accounted for” is inadvertently confirmed 
by even sympathetic research on the veil. As she notes, “Restricting the analysts’ lens 
to orthodox Muslim conduct like veiling, and leaving other forms of (pious) conduct 
unexplored, results indeed in a situation wherein only practices that fail to correspond 
with ‘secular ways of life’ are turned into the object of research” (2011: 85).
14. Although we focus on the work of Samuli Schielke and Magnus Marsden as the oft-
cited proponents of this turn to everyday Islam, our interest also extends to scholarship 
as diverse as Al-Mohammad (2012); Al-Mohammad and Peluso (2012); Das (2012); 
Debevec (2012); Khan (2006, 2012); Mittermaier (2012); and Simon (2009). We do not 
suggest any homogeneity to this literature and recognize the very different orientations 
and analytic attachments that animate these studies. We are nonetheless interested in 
how all these works frame the everyday as a site of complexity, ambiguity, or encounter 
(in contrast to religious institutions and norms), what effects this framing has for the 
anthropology of religion, and what normative sensibilities might underlie—even inad-
vertently—this framing.
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cite Bronislaw Malinowski’s well-known phrasing (1922: 18).15 This concept, to-
gether with its twin “the ordinary” (Lambek 2010a; Stewart 2007), have anchored 
attempts to understand the vicissitudes of large-scale structures by examining their 
enactments in daily speech and practice.16 Ranging from Irving Goffman’s seminal 
Presentation of the self in everyday life (1959), which examines the different frames 
individuals use to locate and construct themselves as social subjects, to Henri 
Lefebvre’s Critique de la vie quotidienne (1958), which calls for a de-familiarization 
of the everyday, the everyday has been understood as a space of contradictions that 
help us unravel the ways in which social structures or systems are materialized or 
contested (or both). A structural tension therefore animates the analytical focus on 
micropractices: while the concept of the everyday seeks to understand the opera-
tion of power, it does so by accounting for its mutability through daily iterations.
Michel de Certeau’s The practice of everyday life (2011) remains one of the most 
popular and influential illustrations of such an approach. There, de Certeau at-
tends to the creative poetics of the “common man” in his patterns of consumption, 
offering a microanalysis of the operation of power in its daily enactments and re-
negotiations. At the same time, for de Certeau, strategies of everyday resistance to 
power rely on existing (though nondominant) repertoires of action, such as folk-
tales, myths, epic legends, and games. De Certeau’s account of the everyday thereby 
foregrounds creativity and resistance while simultaneously inscribing them within, 
rather than dislocating them from, existing norms and values. Rather than oppo-
sing agency to power, de Certeau reconceptualizes agency as a tactical deployment 
of power. Lila Abu-Lughod’s Veiled sentiments (2000), a powerful ethnography of 
everyday Bedouin life in Egypt, is another example of this approach. Abu-Lughod 
traces how Bedouins use poems to articulate sentiments of vulnerability otherwise 
impermissible within the honor-driven moral framework of ordinary social life. 
Rather than posit moral discourse as the site of powerful social rules and Bedouin 
poetic expression as the site of agentive, creative resistance to them, Abu-Lughod 
underscores how poetry is also a social convention, a “cultural repertoire” of sen-
timents and actions (180). She thereby reads the situation as one in which moral 
discourse and poetry constitute two competing social conventions within which 
Bedouins are produced as subjects, rather than as one convention (morality) con-
straining the human spirit (expressed in poetry). And, importantly, Abu-Lughod 
does not portray Bedouins as contradictory or incoherent subjects. Instead, through 
15. In the introductory passages to Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Malinowski uses this 
expression to insist that analysts should attend to the “routine of a man’s working day, 
the details of his care of the body, of the manner of taking food and preparing it; the 
tone of conversational and social life around the village fires, the existence of strong 
friendships or hostilities, and of passing sympathies and dislikes between people” 
(1922: 19). These details, he explains, are crucial to understand the way structures work 
and are maintained.
16. Michael Sheringham (2009) argues that the focus on the everyday as a distinct scholarly 
perspective emerged as part of the postwar French intellectual movement that relied on 
Surrealism and sought to decenter and reimagine political life. For a further overview 
of the theoretical deployment of the everyday in cultural theory, see Highmore (2002) 
and Kaplan and Ross (1987).
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careful attention to the networks of concepts that underpin the honor code and 
poetry, she tries “to explain the logic of the system [as a whole]” (xxi). In a more 
recent ethnography that follows Abu-Lughod’s lead, Lara Deeb and Mona Harb 
examine how Shi‘ite Muslims in southern Beirut draw on multiple moral rubrics 
to create new modes of pious leisure. They describe a “complex moral landscape” 
(2013: 10) within which young people “who don’t view their lives as necessarily 
bifurcated [between religious norms and everyday leisure] . . . are striving to bring 
fun and faith together in ways they feel are more compatible—striving for a greater 
level of consistency in their lives across these dimensions” (32).
Although Deeb and Harb do not explicitly foreground the everyday as an ana-
lytic, other recent anthropological works have been more explicit in invoking the 
everyday. Samuli Schielke stands out as an influential proponent of this turn to 
everyday Islam, and his essay “Being good in Ramadan” (2009), on the experi-
ences and daily practices of “ordinary Muslims” in a northern Egyptian fishing 
village during the month of Ramadan, is often cited by other scholars as an analyti-
cal touchstone.17 While Schielke has since published a more expansive monograph 
(Schielke 2015), we mostly focus on the essay here because it concisely represents 
both the major claims and attendant pitfalls of the turn to everyday Islam. In his es-
say, Schielke describes Ramadan as a time not only for fasting and praying but also 
for festive forms of sociality and fun, like football. Although “there is a general sense 
of increased social, moral, and pious commitment during Ramadan,” he writes, 
such a “focus on reward and piety” is temporally exceptional (2009: S26–27). Daily 
fasting is followed by nightly entertainment and conspicuous consumption. More-
over, the month itself stands apart from the rest of the year: Ramadan is a “time of 
exceptional morality that, by its nature, will last only as long as Ramadan lasts . . . 
and this exceptional nature indirectly legitimizes less consistent approaches to re-
ligion and morality for the rest of the year” (2015: 50). As Schielke explains, “This 
is a highly utilitarian understanding of religion that implicitly allows Ramadan to 
be established as a moral and pious exception from not so perfect everyday life. If 
Ramadan is a time of exceptional reward when God forgives one’s previous sins, 
one may commit some sins and slip a little from one’s obligations during the rest of 
the year” (2009: S28).18 Thus, Schielke concludes, “The ways in which most people 
17. Samuli Schielke is cited as such by, among others, Debevec (2013: 211); Deeb and Harb 
(2013: 16-17; Laidlaw (2014: 173); and Mittermaier (2012: 250). We concentrate on 
his two essays “Being good in Ramadan” (2009) and “Being a nonbeliever in a time of 
Islamic revival” (2012), which distill the central claims made in his longer monographs 
and edited collections. While Schielke’s monograph is certainly ethnographically richer 
than his articles, it retains the main problems we identify here, namely, the notion of 
religion as a set of abstract rules in opposition to everyday life, and the understanding 
of Salafism as an impossible and unnatural way of being.
18. Schielke’s discussion of Ramadan in Egypt in the future tense (2015) is more nuanced 
than the earlier article version, emphasizing the complexity of non-Ramadan moral-
ity. As he writes, “the power of the moral shift of the feast lies not simply in the falling 
back to bad habits. More important, it marks the shift from a period of observance 
during which the sins of the previous year are erased to a more complex order of mo-
rality” (51). Nonetheless, a dual structure that opposes a time of exceptional morality 
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practice Ramadan do not require an ethical subjectivity that aims at the perfection 
of a purified, God-fearing self capable of keeping right and wrong clearly apart” 
(2009: S28). Indeed, Schielke takes explicit issue with the recent focus on Muslim 
piety and what he considers the “problematic tendency to privilege the aim of ethi-
cal perfection” (2009: S35). Rather than aiming for ethical perfection, he contends, 
his Muslim interlocutors usually contradicted or evaded strict moral norms: when 
the holy month ends with the feast of ‘id al-fitr, the same young men who pray 
and fast during Ramadan go back to smoking hashish, watching porn, and sexu-
ally harassing women in public parks and promenades (2009: S29). He therefore 
argues that ethnographic focus should be redirected toward the “ambivalent na-
ture of most moral subjectivities,” and to “conflicts, ambiguities, double standards, 
fractures and shifts” (2009: S38). Doing so enables the analyst to understand better 
how religious norms operate on a day-to-day basis, an approach Schielke frames as 
attending to the distinction between “grand schemes” and “the actual paths people 
take” (2015: 127).
Schielke’s emphasis on ambivalence, ambiguity, and contradiction echoes other 
scholarship that similarly seeks to underline the complexities of Muslims’ everyday 
religiosity. Liza Debevec, for example, writes on “moderate” Muslims in Burkina 
Faso who, although they recognize the importance of salat (daily prayer) for their 
religious practice, nonetheless postpone these salat until a later stage of their lives. 
Like Schielke, Debevec wants to complicate prevailing accounts of piety by taking 
into account not only moments in which explicit moral aims are realized but also 
those in which they fail to take hold: “The demand that Muslims must pray regu-
larly, and the discussion about how to do it properly, is part of everyday religious 
life just as much as the claim to postponing piety until a more appropriate moment 
is” (2012: 35). Other scholars write in similar terms of the “critical engagement” 
Muslims have with the norms by which they seek to abide (de Jorio 2010: 92), of 
the moments of doubt that are as integral as moments of faith to Muslims’ lives 
(Aishima and Salvatore 2010), of “internecine tensions and ambivalences” that un-
derpin pious discourse (Huq 2010: 165), or the “experience of uncertainty, tension, 
and anxiety” that accompany the ritual performance of prayer (Simon 2009: 270). 
In so doing, they underscore how Muslims’ ethical and moral lives are marked by 
fracture and failure, inconsistency and incoherence. And attention to these “ev-
eryday experiences” remains essential, these scholars argue, for a comprehensive 
understanding of the complex relationship Muslims hold to religious norms and 
the contradictory desires that persistently animate Muslim subjects.
Part of showing that Muslims are not saturated by normative religious require-
ments entails highlighting the agency of ordinary Muslims. Consider, for instance, 
Magnus Marsden’s (2005, 2010) ethnography of Chitrali Muslims in northern 
Pakistan. In an article on the touring practices of young Chitrali men who traverse 
the local countryside, Marsden regards these tours as an escape from or resistance 
to doxic social norms: “Chitrali tours are an everyday social practice that are of-
ten purposefully deployed by people—albeit temporarily—to distance themselves 
from the concerns of sectarian difference and status distinction that permeate 
(Ramadan) to “everyday temporality” (outside of Ramadan) continues to inform his 
analysis. It is to this dual structure that our critique attends.
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everyday village life” (2010: 66). Moreover, in contradistinction to village life, these 
tours offer Chitralis a space for creativity and critical reflection:
Chitrali touring . . . cultivates a modality of understanding and perceiving 
the wider world founded not on the active cultivation of embodied 
ethical dispositions but in the appreciation of a mindful, if often sceptical, 
curiosity about heterogeneity. .  .  . In spite of the pressures placed upon 
Chitrali Muslims to conform to Islamic doctrinal standards, during the 
course of their tours Chitralis expect one another to question, to reflect 
upon, and interrogate the conditions of their everyday lives. (68)
Touring is a temporary tactic against social convention. Marsden’s article draws on 
his monograph Living Islam (2005), which is driven by an explicit desire to show that 
Chitrali Muslims lead “intellectually vibrant and emotionally significant lives” (1), 
and there he expands on the critical engagements his interlocutors have with revival-
ist tendencies in the region. They do so not only through intellectual arguments but 
also through poetry, dance, and musical performances, as well as through esoteric 
customs like amulet-wearing, all of which reformist trends consider illegitimate. Prac-
tices like touring, poetry, music, and dance, Marsden argues, are based on an appreci-
ation of skepticism, self-reflection, heterogeneity, wit, irony, and humor, all values that 
he posits against social convention and the homogeneity cultivated by revivalist Islam.
The different contributions sketched above present the everyday as a site of crea-
tivity, individuality, and transgression, a space in which Muslims negotiate and, 
importantly, contest the normative requirements to which they are subjected by en-
acting a set of alternative desires. Everyday practices thereby appear as moments of 
disruption, of not conforming to religious norms. But this invocation of the everyday 
as only a site of contingency or resistance can lead to an oppositional distinction be-
tween domains that are saturated by power and social conventions (Islamic doctrine 
and morality) and those that are not (everyday practices). Consider, again, Marsden’s 
ethnography of Chitrali touring. “Chitral’s landscape,” he writes, “is injected with 
abstract religious concepts that posit the possibility of experiences of moral, selfless, 
and devotional-like feelings of love to one’s beloved—human or divine” (2010: 61). 
He continues: “Abstract and Sufi-derived conceptions of other-worldly love sit jag-
gedly alongside feelings of lust, desire, and love that are widely considered as being 
illicit” (62). For Marsden, religion (as a moral discourse) occupies the space of con-
ceptual abstraction, while the everyday is constituted by sensibility and affect, by 
experience and feeling unmediated by discourse. Such an understanding posits the 
individual as separate from power and processes of socialization, bifurcating dis-
courses and norms from the raw experiences of the subject. This approach neglects 
the ways in which individual experiences and actions, even those that transgress 
dominant norms, are always produced within and mediated by discursive norms 
and power relations. After all, rather than only an escape from custom or village 
tradition, touring could equally be viewed as a social convention, a tradition of sorts, 
especially given that “Chitralis talk about tours as providing complex opportunities 
to hone their capacity to enact and cultivate diverse modes of sociality and moral, 
aesthetic, and intellectual sensibilities” (55). Indeed, touring, like musical perfor-
mance and poetry, seem to be standard practices of subjectivation, central to learn-
ing how to be a proper Chitrali male. Instead of a temporary escape from norms, 
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then, as Marsden argues, touring, music, and poetry seem to be as integral to nor-
mative Chitrali social structure as Islamist morality and village social conventions.
The opposition between social/moral norm and individual agent upheld here 
parallels an opposition between religion and other societal domains assimilated to 
the everyday (like love or family). Islamic traditions and normative discourses are 
posited as an abstract, otherworldly moral system, in contradistinction to everyday 
practices that often contradict or do not live up to the values of that system. Re-
call Marsden’s description of Chitral’s landscape as “injected with abstract religious 
concepts” that “sit jaggedly alongside feelings of lust, desire, and love” (2010: 61). 
Marsden never explains why these concepts are abstract rather than real, especially 
since Chitralis clearly seek to live and experience them. Regardless, religion here 
occupies the space of the abstract and otherworldly, while lust, desire, and love exist 
in the real, the everyday. Debevec understands her interlocutors’ continual deferral 
of salat in similar terms: “The conflict which people try to postpone could also be 
understood as a conflict between the real and the ideal world of the people of Bobo 
Dioulasso” (2012: 45). The distinction between the ideal and the real, the abstract 
and the everyday is an attempt to “account for the complex duality of religion as an 
everyday practice and a normative doctrine” (Schielke and Debevec 2012a: 1) and 
to correct the emphasis on “normative doctrines as the primary field of religion” by 
attending to how people “actually live religious lives” (2). Marsden, Debevec, and 
other like-minded scholars therefore foreground what they see as a tension between 
what people say (their ostensible commitment to moral rules or “grand schemes”) 
and what they “actually” do. As a result, they are critical of anthropologists of ethics 
who “focus on the declared aim of pious discipline rather than its actual outcome” 
(Schielke 2009: S24). Schielke’s reference to “actual outcome” is telling in that it 
reveals a broader approach: any gap between moral rules and “actual” practices is 
seen as evidence of the inefficacy, failure, or rejection of Islamic norms, rather than 
as an indication of the complex ways in which those norms are lived and enacted, 
a view that only confirms the distinction between a moral system and individual 
agents who exist outside that system. While it is certainly important to attend to 
the everyday practice of religious life, the scholars examined here end up simply 
inverting what Schielke and Debevec call the “hierarchy of a primary and second-
ary field of religion” (Schielke and Debevec 2012a: 2). By privileging “everyday 
practice” over “normative doctrine,” a strict distinction between those two domains 
is reiterated, reproducing Robert Redfield’s (1956) distinction between great and 
little traditions and Ernest Gellner’s (1981) differentiation between high and folk 
Islam. In fact, these scholars do more than reiterate these classical distinctions: they 
also conceptualize normative doctrine and everyday practice as unconnected and, 
indeed, as opposed. Yet the fact that a commitment to a particular norm is often 
imperfectly achieved does not refute the importance attached to that norm. The 
need to work with, through, or against other inclinations remains central to any 
ethical commitment. The efficacy of norms is not only determined by their realiza-
tion but also by conscious and unconscious discursive and affective attachments 
to them, irrespective of one’s “actual” practices. The fact that Schielke’s interlocu-
tors watch porn does not imply that they do not define such conduct as morally 
wrong. It is by considering the complex discursive and affective attachments one 
holds to religious prescriptions and practices, and not only the extent to which they 
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are being realized, that one can have a full grasp of their weight and impact on an 
individual.19
In the aforementioned articulations of everyday Islam, however, religion emerg-
es as a set of abstract rules that are lived very differently “on the ground,” that is, 
within the realm of the real, the human, the everyday. This split produces con-
tradictory conceptual and methodological effects for the study of religion: on the 
one hand, religion stands outside individual conduct as a set of abstract doctrinal 
rules demarcated in texts and by religious authorities; on the other, “real” religion 
is found precisely in individual, everyday conduct recorded by the ethnographer. 
The analyst’s role consequently becomes one of accounting for the ambiguities and 
contradictions of Muslims’ ethical journeys, and of giving voice and legitimacy to 
these seemingly repressed realities resulting from the impossible demands made 
by religion. One finds such an approach in the work of Debevec (2012), who offers 
an otherwise compelling account of the practice of postponing prayer until later in 
life. Her essay traces the different reasons her interlocutors give to account for this 
“failure” to practice correctly, which range from demonic temptations to the ab-
sence of a stable and settled life. However, while her own interlocutors understand 
the practice of postponing prayer as an effect of their spiritual or social weaknesses, 
Debevec appears reluctant to accept her interlocutors’ own explanation—one 
might even call it resolution—of this “contradiction.” She prefers, rather, to regard 
it as a tactical move—an act of conscious or unconscious agency—that helps her 
interlocutors negotiate “the very strict and detailed prescriptions of a proper life as 
a Muslim” (2012: 44).20 Postponing prayer, she writes, is “a successful solution to 
the potential conflict of pious ideals and a complex life” (2012: 45). Debevec seems 
analytically committed to restoring the agency of her Muslim interlocutors, whose 
religiosity might be seen as questionable in the eyes of preachers and purists (see 
also Debevec 2013: 231).
19. Our argument here draws on Talal Asad’s seminal critiques of Ernest Gellner, deve-
loped in The idea of an anthropology of Islam (Asad 1986b) and “The concept of cultur-
al translation in British social anthropology” (Asad 1986a). In both works, Asad takes 
issue with the authority of the analyst to decipher and decode subjects’ behavior while 
disregarding the meaning and signification attributed to it by the subjects themselves. 
The first essay problematizes a Gellnerian perspective that represents actors as involved 
in a dramatic struggle without any consideration of the meaning and discourses that 
orient their conduct (1986b: 8). The second essay critically explores Gellner’s work in 
relation to the privileged position the anthropologist accords himself to decipher and 
decode the “real meaning of what Berbers say (regardless of what they think they say)” 
(Asad 1986a: 155).
20. Maria Louw provides a different account of similar declarations by ordinary Muslims 
in Uzbekistan that they hold little knowledge about Islam. Louw takes these declara-
tions as a starting point to understand “what it means to be Muslim in post-Soviet 
Uzbekistan, and to understand and conceptualize which experiential realities people 
are actually referring to when they talk about ignorance and oblivion” (2009: 19). Deeb 
and Harb (2013) also take a different approach by trying to understand how seeming 
contradictions are resolved by those who experience them, usually by inquiring into 
the emic reasoning of their interlocutors and in so doing foregoing the framework of 
contradiction.
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In the case of Schielke’s article on Ramadan, we witness little effort to account 
for the ways his interlocutors conceive of their ambivalent relationship to, and non-
fulfillment of, moral norms. The reader gets little sense of how, for example, the 
young men who fast during Ramadan and watch porn during the rest of the year 
explain this seemingly discrepancy. How do these men negotiate their competing 
desires? How do they make sense of or resolve for themselves what Schielke sees as 
contradictory behavior? Even when his interlocutors do try to explain their com-
portment, Schielke seems to reject their explanations. He gives us the example of 
Mustafa, a former Salafi who “now regularly shaves, has returned to smoking, prays 
irregularly, and maintains contact with female friends in a way in which Salafis 
would consider unacceptable” (2009: S33). Mustafa himself sees his behavior as a 
temporary suspension of piety and hopes to return to a more pious lifestyle even-
tually. He is not ambivalent about or uncommitted to the ideal of piety; rather, he 
has a sense of past, present, and future, and he understands his comportment in 
the present in orientation to a more perfect but deferred future of more rigorous 
practice. Schielke, however, reads Mustafa’s trajectory as a transition from “com-
mitment to ambivalence,” an example of “everyday lives loaded with ambiguities 
and contradictions” (S33).21 The absence of an emic accounting makes the frame-
work of contradiction and ambivalence seem external, unrecognized as such by 
“everyday Muslims” themselves.
This positions the analyst as someone who not only records tensions and con-
flicts that might arise from conflicting demands but also resolves some of these 
tensions by turning any discrepancy between norm and practice into either a tactic 
demarcating human agency (in the case of Debevec) or a sign of the consistent 
opposition between moral norm and individual behavior (in the case of Schielke). 
Either way, religious norms and everyday practices emerge as distinct realms, one 
a space of abstract rules that are impossible to realize fully and the other a space 
of complexity and “actual” human conduct, where agency and choice are enacted 
in opposition to (religious) norms. Within this binary, the analyst emerges as the 
voice of authority who can in some cases even objectively determine the truth of 
her interlocutors better than they can. Schielke’s claim that Ramadan is objectively 
a time of exceptional morality, for example, relies on ignoring “religious authori-
ties and ordinary citizens” who “argue that Ramadan should be a time of spiritua-
lity and moral cultivation that helps create a committed Muslim personality and 
21. Schielke significantly expands on Mustafa’s reasoning in his later monograph, though 
he still does not accept Mustafa’s declaration of his Salafi path as a choice, arguing, “this 
choice was extremely limited from the start. None of the many other currents of Islamic 
piety and practice was on his list of options. More important, all the options were ex-
plicitly Islamic” (2015: 142). Schielke’s understanding of choice as action unconstrained 
by norms appears again in a discussion of Mustafa’s refusal to go against the wishes of 
his mother, who does not want him to marry a divorced woman. Schielke does not 
understand Mustafa’s refusal as an ethical commitment to family but rather as a lack 
of “real choice” (101). As he writes, “Mustafa repeatedly sought a space of freedom 
in his marriage plans, but he faced powers too great to overcome” (101). There is no 
sense that that “power”—i.e., his mother’s will—is part of a broader ethical paradigm 
that marks a particular commitment to family, and that Mustafa’s decision to obey his 
mother is also a choice, albeit one made in relation to ethical or moral obligations.
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society free of vices and unnecessary spending, oriented toward individual and col-
lective self-improvement” (2015: 50). In other words, he mentions only in passing 
a very different Muslim understanding of Ramadan, then dismisses this perspec-
tive in the very next sentence. At the same time, part of the reason there seems no 
need to explore ethnographically how one’s interlocutors might make sense of the 
discrepancy between moral ideal and actual practice—what many of these anthro-
pologists understand as contradiction, ambivalence, and ambiguity—is that this 
discrepancy seems natural (a point we will elaborate in the next section). If fast-
ing, praying, and sexual abstinence are forms of exceptional behavior that occupy 
the realm of religion, then playing football, watching porn, smoking, and praying 
irregularly are forms of “everyday” practice that do not need to be explained or 
theorized beyond marking, first, their empirical facticity and, second, their status 
as conduct that implicitly and explicitly resists doctrinal norms and thereby signals 
the creativity, critical spirit, and agency of the human being.
Our disagreement with this approach, one that posits a distinction between 
norms and individual agents and between religion and the everyday, replays an 
older debate in anthropology between proponents of practice theory and post-
structuralist critics. In an essay representative of the former group, Sherry Ortner 
calls on anthropologists to “see people not simply as passive reactors to and enac-
tors of some ‘system,’ but as active agents and subjects in their own history” (1984: 
143), and to focus not on “the hidden hand of structure” but rather on “real people 
doing real things” (144). In response, Jane F. Collier and Sylvia J. Yanagisako point 
out that “an emphasis on agency, strategy, and the interest of individuals in practice 
approaches can easily lead to an implicit opposition between the ‘practical’ and 
the ‘symbolic.’ Such a scheme overlooks the fact that people’s ‘practical’ concerns 
and strategies are as culturally constructed as so-called ‘symbolic’ ones” (1989: 30). 
Moreover, they argue, the distinction between the “symbolic” (or structural/nor-
mative) and “practical” makes nonsymbolic practices ostensibly transparent: “They 
are simply what they are” (31). This has a number of effects: “when we define cer-
tain actions as symbolic, we risk setting ourselves the task of ferreting out the ‘true’ 
meaning of these actions,” with the concomitant presumption that “actions not la-
beled as symbolic have obvious—i.e., pragmatic and equally familiar—aims” (31). 
As Michelle Rosaldo once observed, by “‘separating out the symbolic from the 
everyday, anthropologists quickly come upon such ‘universal’ facts as correspond 
to their assumptions’” (quoted in Collier and Yanagisako 1989: 31). Rosaldo’s and 
Collier and Yanagisako’s critiques apply, we find, to much of the anthropology of 
everyday Islam and its understanding of what constitutes the real and the universal. 
Although this anthropology explicitly aims to counterbalance scholarship it finds 
overdetermined by a focus on norms, it draws on a set of universalizing claims 
about what constitutes the everyday by relying on a tacit distinction between, on 
the one hand, exceptional or extra-ordinary subjects who have a strong commit-
ment to religious norms (usually labeled “Salafis”) and, on the other, “ordinary” or 
“everyday” Muslims who do not.
The everyday Muslim thus emerges as a familiar figure, one whose behavior 
does not need to be explained and who, in her ambivalent, critical, and even con-
testatory relationship to Islamic norms, seems very much like the mostly secular-
humanist analysts who study the Muslim world. Even those anthropologists not 
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invested in liberal-humanist conceptions of religion as a set of abstract norms, 
or of agency as the active resistance to norms,22 or even of the everyday as the 
site of the “real,” seem to invoke this figure when they deploy the everyday as an 
analytical frame. Naveeda Khan (2006, 2012), for example, posits the everyday as 
a paradigmatic site of skepticism, ambiguity, and uncertainty; Veena Das (2010) 
sees it as a site of encounter and unexpected possibility; Amira Mittermaier, for her 
part, writes of the “experience of contingency and vulnerability that marks much 
of everyday life” (2012: 260). The everyday thereby emerges as a space in which 
norms fail to take hold rather than are (also) reiterated. In these different accounts, 
then, the everyday becomes not only an analytical frame but also a normative one: 
as a space characterized by friction, contestation, uncertainty, and subversion, the 
everyday stands as a recuperative site of humanist possibility. Concomitantly, the 
everyday Muslim emerges as a familiar humanist subject who looks very much like 
her anthropologist interlocutor.
In the particular geopolitical context in which we write, it may make sense to 
insist on such similitude, one that incorporates Muslims “others” into the realm of 
the human. Yet this insistence on sameness via the paradigm of the everyday comes 
at a cost, namely, the banishment of the exceptional or extra-ordinary Muslim—the 
pious Salafi—not just from the realm of the everyday but also, concomitantly, from 
the realm of the human. It is to this process that we now turn.
The impossibility of the “Salafi” Muslim
In the previous section, we attended to the opposition between social/moral norm 
and individual agent at the heart of this turn to everyday Islam. We did so not sim-
ply because we have a number of theoretical disagreements with this approach but 
more importantly because we see in this differentiation a tendency to naturalize 
certain comportments as both valuable and fundamentally human, and, as a result, 
to determine the ontological status of different forms of Muslim life.23 Put another 
way, the paradigm of the everyday operates here as a normative modality of onto-
logical differentiation, distinguishing between real and unreal (or impossible) ways 
of being.
As part of their critique of the ostensible overfocus on pious self-cultivation, 
Osella and Soares offer the concept of islam mondain, which they translate as 
“Islam in the present world.” As they note, “Islam mondain does not privilege Islam 
over anything else, emphasizing instead the actual world in which Muslims find 
themselves” (2010: 12). It is not clear how Islam could be anything but lived in the 
22. Naveeda Khan (2012), for instance, understands the skepticism and striving present in 
everyday life as inherently social phenomena, produced through social relations and 
philosophical-cultural traditions rather than emanating naturally from the individual 
self; importantly, she also does not see skepticism as opposed to religious belief but 
as internal to Islamic practices and traditions. Mittermaier’s (2012) meditation on di-
vinely inspired dreams presents a Muslim subject-agent integral to Sufi strands of the 
Islamic tradition who does not act but is rather acted upon by dreams and the divine.
23. By ontology and ontological we mean a mode of being or existing (see Fanon 1952).
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actual world. Nevertheless, Islamic traditions—the focus of scholarship on piety 
against which they propose islam mondain—do not, it would seem, constitute the 
actual world in which Muslims live. For Osella and Soares, there is little sense that 
actively cultivated piety might be a response to, and therefore part of, the “actual 
world in which Muslims find themselves.” This framework is dangerously close 
to the common secular critique that ultraorthodox or “Salafi”24 Muslims are, as is 
often put, “living in the Middle Ages,” that is, mistaking one epoch for another. It 
is also related to the conception of religion at work in the anthropology of every-
day Islam discussed earlier, whereby religion (in this case Islam) exists outside real 
space and time as otherworldly and abstract, to use Marsden’s terminology.
What, then, constitutes the real, actual world, the space and time of the ev-
eryday? Osella and Soares lay out a series of revealing oppositions in articulating 
the difference between what they call the “‘piety’ turn” (2010: 10) and the kind 
of anthropological analysis (captured by the term islam mondain) found in their 
coedited volume. Referring to Schielke’s essay on Ramadan, they write that in con-
trast to “some studies [that] over-privilege the coherence and disciplinary power 
of Islam . . . we learn here about the ambiguities in young Egyptian men’s lives and 
everyday practice, with all its contradictions and imperfections” (12). If the earlier 
studies emphasize certainty, they continue, their volume’s contributors focus on 
doubt. Where the piety turn focuses on “the active cultivation of embodied ethical 
dispositions,” the anthropology of everyday Islam attends to practices that foster 
“the appreciation of a mindful, if often sceptical, curiosity about heterogeneity,” 
and to Muslims who are “reflexive and outspoken on religious matters” (13). Thus 
certain sensibilities and attitudes—curiosity, self-reflection, ambiguity, contradic-
tion, imperfection, doubt, skepticism—constitute the domain of the everyday, of 
the real or actual world. Osella and Soares (2010) and Marsden (2010) explicitly 
state that they are not grafting “liberal secular standards onto unsuspecting non-
liberal subjects” (Marsden 2010: 68), and that these values emerge from and are just 
as germane to non-Western cultural traditions. We do not disagree. We are none-
theless struck by how the sensibilities and attitudes that comprise the everyday—
the domain of the real—are precisely those sensibilities and attitudes most valued 
by the secular-humanist tradition. If one of the goals of these anthropologists is to 
dismantle the ontological exceptionalism often ascribed to Muslims by the secular 
West (an exceptionalism they believe is reiterated by scholars of Islamic piety), the 
reincorporation of Muslims into the realm of the ordinary hinges on showing how 
Muslims—or at least “everyday Muslims”—cultivate and celebrate values that are 
deeply familiar to secular sensibilities.
Those values, sensibilities, and attitudes are not just universalized but also na-
turalized as the normal state of human nature—a naturalization that contradicts 
these anthropologists’ explicit calls to account for the diversity of Muslim life and 
results in an ontological differentiation between what counts as real and what is 
24. Though “Salafi” now circulates in academic, political, and media discourse as a catchall 
term for ultra-orthodox and/or Wahhabi-inspired Muslims, we use the term with cau-
tion, and usually to refer to other scholars’ terminology. For aesthetic reasons we do not 
continually use scare quotes around the term, but they are always implied. See note 25 
for more on the term and our reasons for caution.
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unreal or exceptional. Consider, once again, Schielke’s article on Ramadan, which, 
he argues, is an exceptional period of reinforced ethical commitment that enables a 
more flexible relationship to religious norms during the rest of the year. Ramadan, 
he writes
is a time of exceptional morality [that] demonstrates and enforces the 
supremacy of God’s commands by constituting a time in which morality 
is not situational but strict and in which religious obligations must be 
fulfilled. But in the end it is precisely the temporary rigor of the holy 
month that establishes and legitimizes the flexible nature of norms and 
ethics for the rest of the year. (Schielke 2009: S28)
Schielke here opposes the exceptional time of Ramadan, when moral rules are 
obeyed, to the time of everyday religiosity or everyday practice—the rest of the 
year—when morality is not strict but situational, religious obligations are not ful-
filled, and individuals’ relationships to norms and ethics are flexible in nature. But 
the conceptual/methodological contradiction elaborated earlier—i.e., that religion 
is defined as, on the one hand, abstract moral rules and, on the other, individual 
practice unrelated to and even resistant to those rules—remains. After all, the rest 
of the year, which is not exceptional but rather normal, is precisely not the time and 
space of religion, but of the everyday. For the other element of Schielke’s argument 
(one echoed in his longer monograph and by many of his colleagues) is that play-
ing football, having fun during Ramadan, getting bored, traveling abroad, falling 
in love, striving for material success, being good to one’s parents, or watching porn 
are all illustrations of everyday conduct, and that Muslims are not solely guided by 
religion. Consequently, these practices represent a nonreligious realm (“the every-
day”), whereas other types of practices (such as sexual restraint, praying, or fasting) 
are framed as religious. Within the anthropology of everyday Islam, an ontological 
distinction becomes established between the domain of religion (of Islam) that, 
paradoxically, becomes restricted to those types of conduct that are recognized and 
framed as disciplinary and understood as exceptional to social life. In contrast, 
the everyday becomes the site of flexibility, spontaneity, ambiguity, and ultimately 
secularity.
We see this ontological differentiation and naturalization equally occurring in 
the differentiation between types of Muslims. Recall that the focus on everyday 
Islam has emerged as a corrective to what this scholarship regards as an overem-
phasis on piety and ethical self-cultivation, seeking ways “to account for views that 
are neither clearly nor consistently in line with any grand ideology, and lives that 
are full of ambivalence” (Schielke 2009: S24). It ostensibly seeks to broaden the pic-
ture, to account for Muslims whose lives are not dedicated to ethical self-cultivation 
and self-perfection. And, beyond the simple fact that there are diverse ways of be-
ing Muslim, another justification for broadening anthropologists’ analytical frame-
works concerns representativity: part of the problem with the piety turn, according 
to its critics, is that even though “actual activists in Islamist or piety movements are 
relatively few” (Schielke 2012: 318), scholars of the piety turn take these “commit-
ted religious activists as paradigmatic representatives of religiosity” (Schielke 2009: 
S35; see also Bangstad 2011). In other words, anthropologists of everyday Islam 
seek to reorient the focus from the demographically minoritarian pious subject and 
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to bring into view ordinary Muslims, understood as the overwhelming majority in 
Egypt and elsewhere. As Schielke writes, “we must be careful, not to take the way 
from ambivalence and imperfection to clarity and commitment as the regular and 
typical one. . . . People always live complex lives: a person’s identity is in practice 
dialogical, made up of different voices and experiences. . . . In consequence, people 
commonly shift between different roles and identities” (2009: S33).
Schielke’s is a particularly interesting passage because it shows how a stated 
desire to expand effectively results in the exclusion of certain life forms. Schielke 
begins by noting that an orientation toward clarity and pious commitment is not 
a regular or typical one—a claim about representativity (the pious subject is a mi-
nority one)—but then quickly moves into a different kind of argument, namely, a 
universalist claim about the human subject or, as he puts it, “people”—not some 
people or many people, but rather people. He continues: “Salafis, just like everybody 
else, live everyday lives loaded with ambiguities and contradictions” (S33, empha-
sis added). Later he writes: “Piety does not proceed along a unilinear path. It is an 
ambivalent practice that is often related to specific periods in life, especially those 
marked by crises. . . . This is, of course, common knowledge in Egypt, as it is pro-
bably everywhere. . . . I posit that it is precisely the fragmented nature of people’s 
biographies which, together with the ambivalent nature of most moral subjectivi-
ties, should be taken as the starting point when setting out to study moral discourse 
and ethical practice” (S36). Schielke has gone from a call to attend to the varied 
dimensions of Muslim life (which would call for varied analytical frameworks) to 
a series of normative claims: anthropologists should study Islam and Muslims in a 
very specific way because all forms of piety proceed in the same way and Muslims 
(like all people) are the same everywhere. The methodology proposed by Schielke 
and others—studying religious life as an ambivalent and contradictory endeavor—
relies on stronger normative claim about human nature (“people”).
That normative claim about human nature produces, in turn, a normative claim 
about natural (that is, proper) attitudes toward religion and, concomitantly, about 
the exceptionality of the Salafi Muslim. As we argued earlier, scholars like Marsden, 
Schielke, and Debevec seem to understand religion as a set of moral rules and as 
temporally exceptional—that is to say, under normal circumstances, a strong com-
mitment to fulfilling these moral rules is restricted to exceptional ritual circum-
stances (for example, Ramadan). The natural attitude toward religious rules is one 
of ambivalence and contestation, hence the discrepancy between moral rules and 
actual behavior. This conceptualization of religion results in the normalization 
of forms of conduct that are characterized by a loose and flexible relationship to 
Islamic traditions and an exceptionalization of conduct that strictly adheres to, or 
attempts to adhere to, Islamic norms. And the term “Salafi”—a term whose analyti-
cal usage has been contested25—plays a central role in this delineation of Muslim 
25. The recent edited collection Global Salafism (Meijer 2009) represents the clearest and 
most explicit attempt to grasp the phenomenon of Salafism and determine its precise 
characteristics as a distinct tendency within Islamic revivalism. In a recent paper, how-
ever, Henri Lauzière radically historicizes the term, arguing that salafiyya emerged as 
an analytical category in the first half of the twentieth century within French Oriental-
ist academic literature. While the term did have medieval antecedents, it was not used 
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life. The term “Salafi” functions as a mark of exceptionality, not merely with regard 
to demography—i.e., as a religious minority—but also to ontology—i.e., as a hu-
man aberration. It is used to refer to forms of religiosity seen to stand outside the 
domain of the everyday, that is, forms of religiosity that are extra-ordinary. More 
than simply an analytical or explanatory term, therefore, “Salafi” operates as a nor-
mative category to qualify which kind of actions, habits, and conduct are to be con-
sidered spontaneous and thereby natural, and which are, in contrast, the product 
of a strict regime of self- or other-imposed discipline and therefore the product of 
ideology, not “real” religion but rather politics.26
Indeed, Schielke’s article on Ramadan and portions of his subsequent book on 
youth in post-2011 Egypt are as much a critique of Salafism as they are an analysis 
of everyday Muslim life. Schielke takes the figure of the Salafi as the paradigmatic 
revivalist, despite the hermeneutical and political diversity of the Islamic revival. 
According to Schielke, Salafism entails a commitment to absolute perfection: “To 
be ‘committed’ (multazim), in the dictionary of revivalist Islam, is not just to obey 
God’s commands. It is to develop a character completely devoted to God’s com-
mands in every respect and in every moment. It is to overcome all ambivalence 
and to form a comprehensive and consistent God-fearing personality” (2015: 63).27 
Yet if “complexity is the normal way morality works” (53), the ostensible coherence 
demanded by Salafism is an impossible demand. As Schielke puts in the earlier 
article, the demand for moral perfection “does not mean that people would actu-
ally live this way, and therein lies both the power and the fundamental trouble of 
the Salafi ideal of religiosity” (2009: S32). Thus Salafism “is inherently unstable 
because it includes the attempt to impose on oneself a way of being that stands 
in contradiction with the way human personality and subjectivity actually work” 
(2015: 147). What is striking here is how Schielke’s normative critique of Salaf-
ism relies on the universalist-naturalist understandings of both religiosity and hu-
man nature discussed earlier. Salafis, according to Schielke, make the mistake of 
thinking that one’s life should and can be lived such that “moral rules” and “actual 
practice” might be aligned as much as possible. But, Schielke argues, “people” do 
not and cannot live this way. The “fundamental trouble” with Salafism is that it is 
an unnatural way to live; Salafis not only misunderstand the place of religion—as 
an abstract and other-worldly phenomenon, it should remain outside the real and 
to determine and qualify distinct religious tendencies but rather to point to certain 
theological disagreements. It is through the work of Louis Massignon that the term 
emerged as a distinct category that would come to be adopted within and outside the 
Arab world (2010: 384).
26. Sindre Bangstad (2011) criticizes Mahmood for not calling her interlocutors by their 
proper name—Salafis—and thereby occluding their true (and dangerous) political 
orientations.
27. It should be noted that despite the ethnographic richness of Egypt in the future tense, 
Schielke’s ethnography of Salafism is quite thin. Schielke’s account of Salafism seems 
to rely almost entirely on three former Salafi activists, and even though he notes that 
“not all experiments with Salafi (or other) commitment are transient” and that “[many 
people join the movement and stay for the rest of their life” (2015: 146), we get no sense 
of these people.
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actual world of everyday life—but they also fundamentally contravene human na-
ture itself. Their advocacy of coherence, certainty, and the active commitment to a 
pious and virtuous life impinges on everyday Muslims’ inclinations—that is, natu-
ral, human inclinations—toward contradiction, doubt, curiosity, self-reflection, 
ambiguity, imperfection, and skepticism.
Moreover, the unnaturalness—the inhumanity—of Salafism makes it dangerous 
not only to non-Salafis but also to Salafis themselves. Schielke writes,
the Salafi discourse of piety with its tremendous emphasis on purity 
makes it very difficult to find a balance with different desires. . . . There 
is neither a return to the relative comfort of the negotiated ambiguity 
of living for God in Ramadan and for oneself for the rest of the year, 
nor comfort in the rigid understanding of religion. Since religion stands 
totally beyond critique, people can only search for faults in themselves. 
.  .  . As a consequence the wave of Salafi religiosity with its insistence 
on purity and perfection actually intensifies the fragmentation and 
contradictions in young people’s lives. (Schielke 2009: S34)
Thus a central danger of Salafism—other than posing a problem to everyday 
Muslims—is that it is auto-destructive, both psychically damaging and, ultimately, 
ontologically unsustainable. Despite Schielke’s earlier claims that ambiguity is an 
essential part of life itself, it is now Salafis who become responsible for fragmenting 
the everyday subject. Salafism, Schielke contends, puts considerable pressure on an 
individual’s psyche by proffering an unattainable model of ethical perfection: “On 
the one hand, people can hold to it without having to fully realize it, and its being 
unrealized allows it to remain pure and simple while life is messy and complex. On 
the other hand, however, it can become a serious obstacle in people’s lives, a debate-
killing argument that can lead people into serious crisis and dead end” (2009: S32). 
The ostensible escape Salafism offers from the messy reality of life ends up causing 
the practitioner serious psychic harm. And in so doing, Salafism reveals itself to be 
an unsustainable ideological project: “Salafis, just like everybody else, live everyday 
lives loaded with ambiguities and contradictions. . . . The rigour of Salafi piety that 
makes it so attractive in the mess of the everyday also makes it difficult to maintain 
in the face of ambivalent feelings” (Schielke 2009: S33). Salafism, it turns out, is not 
only unnatural; it is also difficult to sustain precisely because it is unnatural. Over 
the long term, Salafism and the pious Muslim subject aiming at ethical perfection 
are ontological impossibilities.
Let us reiterate that we have no interest in a defense of Salafism. Nor is our 
critique of the scholarship we have discussed prompted by a desire to dismiss the 
ethnographic quality of many of these studies or to do away with the concept of 
the everyday. As noted earlier, the concept has long had an important and criti-
cally vital place within anthropology. Our disagreement lies in how this concept 
has come to be used to differentiate empirically between practices seen as repre-
sentative of everyday life and those that are not in some of this literature. We are 
disturbed by the way in which such use of the everyday reproduces a series of cas-
cading normative distinctions between everyday and exceptional, real and not real, 
natural and unhealthy, human and ontologically impossible. Rather than shedding 
light on the various ways in which religious—as well as other—constraints and 
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commitments inform and structure human conduct, and how these are continu-
ously negotiated, the concept of the everyday here assumes that some practices are 
more natural—more human—than others. In so doing, it delegitimizes—renders 
unnatural—particular modes of conduct and forms of life, which are regarded as 
psychically damaging, ontologically impossible, and an effect of political ideology 
rather than proper ethics or religion.
Conclusion
Scholars have long argued that the subjective commitments of anthropologists play 
a central role not simply in analyzing their objects of study but also in determin-
ing and defining them in the first place. Several authors have focused, for instance, 
on the way authoritative discourses construct the distinct social phenomena—reli-
gion, rationality, the economy, village life—under ethnographic study (Asad 1973, 
1993; Clifford and Marcus 1986; Hymes 1972; Scott 1991; Trouillot 2003). Others 
have addressed the problem of cultural translation—i.e., the difficulty of rendering 
particular concepts, life-worlds, and imaginaries intelligible in the language of the 
social sciences (Asad 1986a; Chakrabarty 2000; Evans-Pritchard 1976; Leenhardt 
1979; Strathern 1990). These critiques have enabled much-needed reflection about 
anthropology’s particular epistemological and semiotic commitments (or lack 
thereof). They have led to the understanding that various social phenomena do 
not merely exist in the world as first-order empirical realities but are, rather, always 
already mediated—for the “native” and the anthropologist. Finally, these critiques 
have prompted an ongoing conversation about the discursive and structural condi-
tions under which social phenomena are turned into discrete objects of observation 
and analysis. Discussion of anthropology’s epistemological, semiotic, and politi-
cal conditions of possibility is far from exhausted, of course, and new scholarship 
continues to contribute to our critical awareness about the ethnographer’s role in 
determining her object of study, about the epistemological and semiotic relevance 
of “native” concepts and categories, and about the vocabularies and scripts through 
which we understand and frame particular phenomena.
This essay is part of that broader conversation, and it has sought to examine the 
conceptual and epistemological contours of recent calls to study “everyday Islam.” 
As we observed, this scholarship emerged as a critique of what it sees as a scholarly 
overemphasis on piety and ethical norms. It seeks to show that the pious Muslim 
is neither paradigmatic nor representative, hence its investment in demonstrating 
the moments of discontinuity, fracture, ambivalence, and incoherence in Muslims’ 
lives. Yet these scholars’ insistence on ambiguity and their concomitant critique of 
norms rely, we suggested, on a particular understanding of agency that posits the 
self as external to and independent of structure of powers (i.e., religion). More-
over, we argued, subjects, practices, and ethical orientations not characterized by 
celebratory incoherence and ambiguity are relegated outside the everyday and be-
come, as a consequence, unworthy of ethnographic attention. As we demonstrated 
in the latter part of the paper, the language of the everyday results in the ontological 
disqualification of a strong commitment to religious norms. Terms such as Salafi 
or activist have a normative rather than analytical function: they serve to dislocate 
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such commitment from the realm of everyday life, framing it as the outcome of 
political or ideological manipulations. The language of the everyday, we concluded, 
does not merely operate as a descriptive account that unravels the imponderabili-
ties of life; it is also a normative vocabulary that serves to disqualify the ontological 
validity of particular life-worlds by delineating them as not-everyday, and, ulti-
mately, as unreal.
It is worth noting how much that normative vocabulary retrenches a series of 
secular-modern ethical-political commitments. As Hirschkind (2014) writes in 
a short commentary for the curated collection on “Everyday Islam” by Cultural 
Anthropology, the space of the everyday “bears a strong affinity to what has conven-
tionally been called the secular; namely, a domain of ambiguity, contingency, skep-
ticism, and pragmatic concern, one relatively immune to the powers of religious 
discipline and normativity.” Hirschkind also perceptively points to the ongoing 
significance of Edward Said’s (1979) critique of Orientalism in the study of Islam 
and Muslim societies. Writing against a tradition of Orientalist scholarship that 
conjured Muslims as intractably attached to an ossified, text-based set of religious 
norms, many contemporary anthropologists insist on attending to practice instead 
of text, doubt instead of certainty, resistance instead of submission to norms. But 
there is a certain irony to Said’s long intellectual shadow over this work, for the an-
ti-Orientalizing gesture of much of the scholarship under discussion produces not 
only the familiar everyday Muslim but also the Salafi or activist Muslim—secular 
modernity’s radical Other. Indeed, as Susan Harding (1991) argues in her impor-
tant essay “Representing fundamentalism,” the secular-modern subject is secured 
through the “fundamentalist” and an accompanying series of polarities: belief ver-
sus doubt, literal versus critical, backward versus modern. Although Harding was 
writing about Christian fundamentalists in the United States, her analysis applies 
equally well to the figure of the Salafi. Harding writes that certain “repugnant” 
groups do not come in for the same anti-Orientalizing gesture of progressive so-
cial scientists, whose “tools of cultural criticism are better suited for some ‘others’ 
and not other ‘others’—specifically, for cultural ‘others’ constituted by discourses 
of race/sex/class/ethnicity/colonialism but not religion.” In other words, “many 
modernist presuppositions still operate uncritically within contemporary studies 
of politics and culture . . . generating a radically parochial imaginary of the margins 
in which only sanctioned cultural ‘others’ survive.” Moreover, given the secularity 
of the social sciences’ epistemological commitments, disrupting “academic repre-
sentations of fundamentalists . . . may provoke charges of consorting with ‘them,’ 
the opponents of [secular] modernity, progress, enlightenment, truth, and reason” 
(Harding 1991: 375–76). Unsurprisingly, anthropologists of ultra-conservative 
Muslims have been accused of, at best, downplaying the deleterious effects of Salaf-
ism or, at worst, being apologists for Salafism (see, e.g., Abbas 2013; Bangstad 2011; 
Gourgouris 2013; Robbins 2013).
Yet the piety turn, as it has been called, and the more general turn to ethics 
within the discipline of anthropology, have opened up avenues of inquiry that we 
as scholars continue to find productive, not only for better understanding the na-
ture of certain forms of religiosity but also for critically interrogating the secular-
liberal presuppositions that underpin much of our lives and, as a result, for better 
understanding the nature of certain forms of secularity. We therefore find some 
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anthropologists’ dismissal of Salafis as incoherent and even inhuman subjects par-
ticularly troubling for its refusal to engage with and be engaged by “the systematic-
ity and reason of the unfamiliar, the strange, or the intransigent” (Mahmood 2005: 
199). That dismissal recalls anthropology’s fraught relationship with so-called lo-
cal knowledge and what Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2003) called “the epistemological 
status of the native voice.” Trouillot contended that “anthropologists never give the 
people they study the right to be as knowledgeable or, more precisely, to have the 
same kind of knowledge about their own societies as ethnographers” (2003: 129). 
At the same time, according to the discipline’s own laudatory self-narrative, much 
of what distinguishes anthropology from its sister social sciences is precisely its 
commitment to taking native voices seriously. That commitment, we want to argue, 
must remain even when faced with interlocutors we might initially find abhorrent. 
Moreover, taking our interlocutors seriously means accepting them as sources of 
knowledge and as theorists in their own right, whose visions can critically inter-
rogate, unsettle, and remake—and not only confirm—our own understandings and 
theorizations of the world. As Tim Ingold argues, the distinction between subjec-
tive participation and objective observation is untenable: participant observation 
is an ontological commitment to learning from and with others, and “to practice 
anthropology is to undergo an education, as much within as beyond the academy” 
(2014: 392). Participant observation is therefore an “unnerving” enterprise and one 
that “entail[s] considerable existential risk” (389).
We recognize that at a time in which the “Muslim question” (Norton 2013) has 
emerged as a civilizational fault-line, accounts that underscore Muslim alterity in 
order to de-familiarize dominant secular-liberal assumptions can sometimes be 
recuperated as evidence of a clash of civilizations. In fact, many of the anthropolo-
gists of everyday Islam we have discussed see themselves as working against the 
unrelenting de-humanization of Muslims by highlighting similarity rather than 
radical difference and offering an account of the ordinariness of Muslims the world 
over. Yet, as we have argued, attempts to emphasize (most) Muslims’ sameness 
in order to undermine a clash of civilizations framework can end up producing 
certain Muslims as aberrational, unnatural, and even inhuman. Ben Highmore 
reminds us in the introductory notes to The everyday life reader that reiterating 
sameness comes at a double cost: the first is that of normalizing and universalizing 
one’s own values and worldviews; the second is that of creating what he calls “im-
plicit ‘others,’” or those “who supposedly live outside the ordinary, the everyday” 
(2002: 1). The anthropology of Islam, it would seem, faces an impasse in which 
Muslims only serve as evidence in a conversation between Western interlocutors 
about the unity or diversity of humankind. One way forward, we want to suggest, 
might entail finding analytical language that does not reproduce the sameness/dif-
ference paradigm seemingly endemic to anthropology. Another might be an ana-
lytical and methodological volte-face, one that inquires into why certain phenom-
ena become problems or questions (the Muslim question, the Jewish question) in 
the first place. In conclusion, then, we want to reiterate that our critical engagement 
with anthropologists of everyday Islam is meant to be just that: critical engagement. 
Although we may disagree on certain analytical and methodological approaches, 
we nonetheless share a sense of dismay about the neo-imperialist nature of Euro-
American engagement with the Muslim world. Indeed, the everyday might be the 
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proper starting place for any ethnography committed to critical de-familiarization 
precisely by making legible and viable the imaginaries, hopes, and aspirations that 
guide the everyday conduct of people considered odd, exceptional, or extraordi-
nary, without simply rendering them as similar to “us.” That commitment has long 
been the lynchpin of the discipline of anthropology; it remains vital to any serious 
consideration of the Muslim world.
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Redécouvrir le musulman « ordinaire » : notes sur une scission anthro-
pologique
Résumé : Cet article examine de manière critique les incitations récentes, formu-
lées par des anthropologues, à étudier ce qu’ils appellent « l’islam ordinaire ». Nous 
situons cette littérature récente au carrefour de deux tensions centrales de l’anthro-
pologie : d’une part, ses engagements avec à la fois les similarités et les différences 
au sein de l’humanité dans son ensemble, et d’autre part, sa volonté de témoigner 
simultanément des structures sociales dominantes et des formes de résistance indi-
viduelle. Nous suggérons que le concept d’islam ordinaire souligne un aspect de ces 
débats paradigmatiques, en mettant en avant l’universel et en insistant sur l’opposi-
tion aux normes. Nous étudions alors la différence faite dans cette littérature entre 
les musulmans ordinaires et les musulmans salafistes. Nous mettons en avant le fait 
que l’investissement actuel dans la notion d’islam ordinaire discrédite la validité, la 
réalité et l’ontologie de ceux qui sont présentés comme des musulmans salafistes, et 
met à mal les ethnographies de la vie musulmane ultra-orthodoxe. Alors même que 
les études de l’islam ordinaire tentent de développer l’anthropologie de l’islam, elles 
limitent son expansion en définissant très étroitement son objet légitime.
Nadia Fadil is Assistant Professor in the Interculturalism, Migration, and 
Minorities Research Centre (IMMRC) at the Anthropology Department of the KU 
Leuven. Her research interests revolve around questions of secularism, religion, 
and Islam.
 Nadia Fadil
 Anthropology Department
 Interculturalism, Migration, and Minorities Research Centre
 KU Leuven
 Parkstraat 45—Box 3615
 3000 Leuven, Belgium
 Nadia.Fadil@soc.kuleuven.be
Mayanthi L. Fernando is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University 
of California, Santa Cruz. Her first book, The republic unsettled: Muslim French and 
the contradictions of secularism (Duke University Press, 2014), addresses the inter-
section of religion and politics in contemporary France. She has recently begun to 
work on law, embodiment, and the sex/gender norms of secularity.
 Mayanthi L. Fernando
 Anthropology Department
 361 Social Science 1
 University of California, Santa Cruz
 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA
 mfernan3@ucsc.edu
